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Two Wrongs Do Make a Right:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia was Established Illegally-but it was the
Right Thing to do... So Who Cares?
By Jeffrey W. Davis*

Introduction'
In the early 1990s, the territory of the former Yugoslavia was
engrossed in war.' It was a region enveloped in unspeakable
atrocities and misdeeds of the most inhuman nature.' Women and
girls were sexually enslaved, men were buried in mass graves, and
ethnicities were "cleansed" to the brink of annihilation.' Captives
imprisoned in concentration camps were forced to drink motor oil,
water from polluted puddles, and discharge from fire

extinguishers.5

One man was forced to orally castrate another

* J.D. Emory University School of Law 2002; B.A. Connecticut
College 1997.
The author is an assistant district attorney and would like to thank Susan for her
proofreading, Professor Johan Van der Vyver for his assistance, Professor Nora
Demleitner for her comments, and his parents for everything else.

I Although this article focuses exclusively on the illegal establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the analysis for its
unlawful formation is substantially the same for that of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. The full title of the ICTY is the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991.
2 Charles Lewis Nier Ill,

The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis of the

Applicability of the Law of War Governing Non-international Armed Conflict in the
Modern World, 10 DICK. J. OF INT'L L. 303, 310 (1992).
3 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
4 Sam Cereste, The International Court of Justice, The International Criminal
Court, and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 17 N.Y.U. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 911, 914 (2001); see
Balkan Precedent: The Case for an International Court Grows, GUARDIAN (London),
Apr. 10, 2000, at 19.
5 Deborah L. Ungar, The Tadic War Crimes Trial: The First Criminal Conviction
Since Nuremberg Exposes the Need for a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 20 WHITTIER
L. REV. 677, 677 (1999) (citations omitted).
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man.6 The need for justice was absolute and the need for action
immediate.
In May 1993, the United Nations Security Council established
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY or Tribunal).7 The creation of this criminal tribunal was a
reaction to the horrific acts perpetrated within the Balkan region.
The ICTY, an ad hoc judicial body of limited jurisdiction,8 was
charged with the "prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.'9
One legal analyst described the creation of the ICTY as a
"direct reaction" to a "collective feeling of guilt among the
international community, resulting from the double failure to
either prevent or stop the massacres" of the Yugoslavian war.' °
Although the precise success level of the ICTY remains a
debatable issue, the Tribunal, at the minimum, must be viewed as
a "limited" success.1" It has been responsible for over 100
indictments of some of the war's most reprehensible criminals and
is currently prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic. 2 The question
remains, however, whether the achievements of the Tribunal and
the dire need for its establishment justify the means by which it
was created.
6 id.
7 Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The ParadoxofInternationalAdjudication: Developments
in the International Criminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the
World Court, and the International Criminal Court, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
551, 554-55 n.10 (2000).
8 James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of
InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 422 (2001).

9 Tiefenbrun, supra note 7, at 554-55 (capitalization altered).
10 Catherine Cissd, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103,
105 (1997). Ms. Cissd is the Legal Advisor for the International Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda.
I1 In general, the ICTY's success is beyond the scope of this article. For a brief
article describing its successes and advocating the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court, see Balkan Precedent,supra note 4, at 19.

12 On February 12, 2002, Slobodan Milosevic, former Yugoslav President, stood
trial in the ICTY, indicted for over sixty counts of genocide and other war crimes.
Anthony Deutsch, Trial on Milosevic Brutality Starts, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at
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The ICTY was created both by powers that far exceeded those
of the Security Council and that were contrary to traditional
canons of statutory interpretation. 13 The drafters of the United
Nations Charter (Charter) never contemplated the establishment of
a criminal tribunal 4 and the powers to create such an institution
were never conferred upon the Security Council."5
Both traditional judicial doctrines and the customary practices
for tribunal establishment lead to the clear conclusion that the
ICTY was created illegally. This article asserts, however, that
faced with either the choice of endorsing the illegal establishment
of the ICTY or allowing the crimes of the Yugoslavian war to go
unavenged, it was a greater wrong to permit the latter. In other
words, for a variety of reasons discussed below, if the Security
Council had not created the ICTY, a criminal tribunal to redress
the crimes of the war probably would not have been established.
Thus, the ICTY's Appeals Chamber and the Security Council had
to choose between illegal creation or no creation. Fortunately and
wisely, both chose illegal creation, and as a result, numerous
criminals have been brought to justice.
Part I of this article provides a general overview of the war in
Yugoslavia with special attention given to the ethnic tensions of
the region.' 6 Part II examines both the history of international
criminal tribunals and the establishment of the ICTY.' 7 Part III of
this article focuses solely on the illegal establishment of the ICTY
through a detailed analysis of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic.'8
Finally, Part IV provides some general conclusions and analyses
about the ICTY's establishment and the need of the Security
Council and the ICTY to hurdle, or at least sidestep, traditional
jurisprudential procedures to respond to the war in Yugoslavia.' 9
13

See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.

14

See generally U.N.

CHARTER

art. 33-55.

15 See id at art. 39, 41-42; Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia
Tribunal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's Power Under Chapter VII of
the Charter, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 509, 509-11 (1996); Julio Barboza, International
Criminal Law, 278 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 128 (1999).
16 See infra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
17

See infra notes 57-92 and accompanying text.

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Defense Motions, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T (June
23, 1995); see infra notes 93-169 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
18
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I. Overview of the Yugoslavian Conflict
From St. Vitus Day in the year 1389 to the assassination of the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, the Balkan region has been
plagued with over five centuries of conflict, ethnic tensions, and
civil strife.2 ' Greatly oversimplified, the basic genesis of the
ethnic disharmony in the region stems from the time of Ottoman
rule. Under Ottoman control, the Balkans' inhabitants were given
the option of either converting to Islam or preserving their culture
and facing subordination, extreme taxation, and subjugation. 2'
Serbs often considered this conversion to Islam as a "betrayal of
the true faith., 2 2 This resulted in a tear in the fabric of the Balkan
populace that remains to be mended.23
In 1919, the Peace of Paris established the "Land of the South
Slavs" or Yugoslavia.24 During the ephemeral and fleeting peace,
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and other ethnic groups
joined together in a most unorthodox and uncomfortable union.
This congregation of ethnicities could not withstand the strains
and assaults of World War II, and it was again divided and
fighting by 1941.26 Divisions and fighting led to movements for
independence, ethnic cleansing, and general upheaval within the
region.27
These perilous conditions ultimately guided Marshall Josip
Broz Tito to power. 28 To some, Tito, the post World War II leader
of Yugoslavia, was considered to be a master statesman for his
ability to unite an ethnically diverse nation and successfully
challenge Joseph Stalin.29 In actuality, Tito was a brutal leader
20

Griffin, supra note 8, at 422.

21

See

MICHAEL P. SCHARF,

BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST

INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG

22 (1997).

22 Id at 22 (citing ARTHUR L. CLARK, BOSNIA, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD
KNOW 77 (1996)).
23 Id. (describing the history of the Yugoslav conflict and the sources of lingering
ethnic tensions in the Balkans).
24 Id. at 23.
25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 24.

29

See

Josip

Broz

Tito,

Premier

of Yugoslavia,

CNN

Interactive,

at
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who used ferocious secret police and the fragmentation of
Yugoslavia's ethnic groups to maintain his preeminence. 30 By
dividing Yugoslavia's ethnic groups, Tito replaced nationalism
and the ethnic struggle with Communism and the class struggle.31
Tito's method of political success prompted one scholar to
remark, his "formula for unity could not survive without his
persona and total authority. 3 2 This comment proved meritorious.
Starting with Tito's death in 1980 and continuing throughout the
decade, severe economic hardship, weak central leadership, and
33
the exploitation of nationalistic sentiments by politicians
condemned Yugoslavia to destabilization and destruction.34
The ethnic and religious divisions between the six republics
and two provinces of Yugoslavia began to widen.35 Some believe
that the Serbs maintained an enduring animosity towards Muslims
originating from their conversion to Islam centuries earlier.36
Whatever the source of the fissure, its expansion was fueled by
nationalistic passions carried to fetishistic proportions.
This fervor was stirred and enflamed by orators and politicians
who desired power and control. 37 The Serbian ultra-nationalist
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/profiles/tito/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
at
(Tito),
Josip Broz
1939-1945:
War
Second World
Regulation);
http://2ndww.tripod.com/Balkans/tito.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
30 See Aleksa Djilas, Tito's Last Secret, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 116, 121 (1995).
31

See id. at 119-20.

32 Dusko Doder, Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds, 91 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 14

(1993).
33 Ungar, supra note 5, at 682.

See generally STUART J. KAUFMAN, MODERN HATREDS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS
165-93 (2001) (discussing the history and complex nature of the ethnic
tensions and their manifestation in the Balkan war).
35 Christopher K. Penny, 'No Justice, No Peace?':A Politicaland Legal Analysis
of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 30 OTTAWA L. REV.
The six republics were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
259, 263 n.9 (1998-99).
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the two provinces were Kosovo and
Vojvodina. Philip J. Cohen, Ending the War and Securing Peace in the Former
34

OF ETHNIC WAR

Yugoslavia, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 19, 26 n. 19 (1994).
36 SCHARF,

supra note 21, at 22 (citing CLARK, supra note 22, at 77).

37 Warren Zimmerman, The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of
Yugoslavia, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 3-5 (1995).
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Slobodan Milosevic perfected this tactic.38 He purposefully
encouraged both ethnically directed violence and ethnic
fanaticism.39 Milosevic reminded Serbs of the Ottoman rule and
past cruelties against the Serbs. 40
In a Nazi-like manner,
Milosevic used propaganda and rhetoric to incite hatred
and
42
racism4 and called for the creation of a "Greater Serbia.,
Although the precise cause of the war in Yugoslavia remains
unsettled,43 what is beyond debate is that following the collapse of
communism, the Yugoslavian democratic elections proved only to
test voters' ethnic loyalties and inevitably confirmed the total
disintegration of Yugoslavia.44 The former Yugoslavia was 46
a
45
nation torn by "ancient ethnic hatreds ' and fervent nationalism.
These explosive factors led to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia
and the documentation of "widespread use of organized
massacres, destruction of towns and villages, [and] systematic and
repeated rape [and] torture.' 4 Murders, physical abuse, mass
graves, ethnic cleansing, 48 concentration camps, 49 and sexual
enslavement ° became the way of the land.
The United Nations, in general, failed in its efforts to arrest the
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia5 and was unable to halt the

38 Mikas Kalinauskas, The Use of InternationalMilitary Force in Arresting War
Criminals: The Lessons of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 387-88 (2002).

40

supra note 34, at 165.
Griffin, supra note 8, at 424 (citation omitted).

41

Ungar, supra note 5, at 682.

42

Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 387-88.

39 KAUFMAN,

43 For a brief review of the numerous competing theories explaining the origins of
the Yugoslavian wars see Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 387-88.
44 Id.at 387.

45

Id. at 388.

46

Penny, supra note 35, at 263.

Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 390.
48 Michael G. Karnavas, The InternationalCriminal Tribunal, 20-DEC CHAMPION
20, 21 (1996).
49 Griffin, supra note 8, at 425.
50 Cereste, supra note 4, at 914.
47

51

Griffin, supra note 8, at 425; Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 390.
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ethnic cleansing.
Arms embargoes, "no fly" zones, safe zones,
and peacekeeping forces had little impact on the fighting. 3 The
Yugoslavian war, especially the Bosnian conflict, persisted until
NATO employed a strategy of continued and "systematic" air
strikes.54 These strikes eventually led to the Dayton Peace
Accords, the peace agreement that ended the Yugoslavian war.5
After failing to a large extent to halt the slaughter and bloodshed
of the war, the United Nations Security Council, on May 25, 1993,
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. 6
II. The ICTY
A. The Background of ICTs
The United Nations Security Council possesses the "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security., 57 Charged with this mission, the Security Council
formed the ICTY in response to the atrocities that took place in the
former Yugoslavia.58 The Tribunal's mandate was to "prosecut[e]
persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia."59 The ICTY was the result of the first endeavor of
the Security Council to establish an international criminal
tribunal.6"
Although far from common occurrences, international

52 Griffin, supra note 8, at 425.
53 Id.
54 Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 391 (citations omitted).

55 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14,
1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996).
56 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

199-201 (1996); Griffin, supra note

8, at 426.
57 U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para.

1.

58 Joshua M. Koran, An Analysis of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Tribunalfor War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 48

(1998).
59 U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
60 Karnavas, supra note 48, at 20.
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prosecutions are not entirely novel to the global community.6'
Following World War II, the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (1945-1946) and the International Military Tribunal at
Tokyo (1946-1948) were established to prosecute German and
Japanese war criminals respectively. 62 The Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals were "neither [pure] criminal nor international"
institutions. 63 Rather they were multinational and military in
nature. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were the victors'
spoils-established through treaty by the four major victorious
nations of the war to punish the crimes of the defeated. 64 Despite
the fact that both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and the
ICTY prosecuted war criminals, they differed substantially from
one another and were formed under inherently different
conditions.65
The ICTY is neither multinational nor military in character. It
is the product of an empowered international community and
serves as a mechanism for advancing "reconciliation and restoring
true peace. 66 The ICTY is committed to "expand[ing] the
jurisprudence of international humanitarian law [and raising] the
international community's level of consciousness regarding the
need of states to enforce international norms., 67 In other words,
the ICTY is a collectively established international judicial
institution created to redress brutal humanitarian violations.

61 In general, international judicial bodies can be grouped into two classifications:
traditional judicial institutions and quasi-judicial dispute settlement or implementation
control bodies. Human rights tribunals are usually considered members of the latter.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 7, at 560.
62 Karnavas, supra note 48, at 20.
63

Id.

64 Id.
65

Cissd, supra note 10, at 104.

66

Karnavas, supra note 48, at 21 (citations omitted).

67 Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The InternationalCriminal Tribunals: Crime &
Punishment in the InternationalArena, 25 NOVA. L. REV. 463, 480 (2001).
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B. The Establishment of the ICTY
As mentioned above, the Security Council's principal charge is
the preservation of "international peace and security. 6 8 As such,
following the reports of international law violations within
Yugoslavia, the Council, through Resolution 780, formed the
The
Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia.69
0
Commission, headed by M. Cherif Bassiouni, was established to
investigate the validity of these alleged violations.7' Only three
months after its commencement, the Commission verified that
severe violations of international humanitarian law were
committed within the region of the former Yugoslavia.72 The
Commission recommended the formation of an ad hoc criminal
tribunal to remedy the violations.73
Heeding the determinations of the Commission, the Security
Council through Resolution 808, recognized that the situation in
Yugoslavia "constitute[d] a threat to international peace and
security."74 This declaration satisfied the procedural requirements
of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter and authorized the Security
Council to use its Article 41 and 42 powers. 75 These powers were
measures to restore
granted to the Council "as enforcement
76
international peace and security.,

Article 42 permits military action, while Article 41 provides
art. 24, para. 1.

68

U.N.

69

S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780

CHARTER

(1992).
70 Mr. Bassiouni currently serves as president of DePaul University's International
Human Rights Law Institute, the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences in Siracusa, Italy, and the International Association of Penal Law in Paris,
France.
71 Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 393.
72 Id.
73 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1997).
74 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993). As a procedural matter, the Security Council must first acknowledge that a
situation represents a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
before the Council is authorized to take restorative actions. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, para.
1.

art. 39, para. 1.
Ciss6, supra note 10, at 106.

75 U.N. CHARTER
76
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for the use of non-military measures." In general, Article 41
sanctions the partial or total stoppage of economic interaction,
diplomatic relations, and channels of communication.78 The
Council decided to act via its Article 41 powers. Accordingly, the
Council adopted Resolution 827, 79 which created the ICTY by
powers the Council believed were conferred to it under Chapter
VII, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter.8"
The specific mandate of the ICTY was to fulfill a fourfold
mission: (1) to bring justice to persons allegedly responsible for
violations of international humanitarian law; (2) to render justice
to the victims; (3) to deter further crimes, and; (4) to contribute to
the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the former
Yugoslavia. 8' Some believed the Security Council did not possess
the power to create an ICT.82 For instance, one scholar remarked,
"the creation of the Tribunal amounted to an unacceptable
stretching of the powers conferred to the Security Council by
' 83
Chapter VII [Art. 41] of the Charter.
During the formative process of the ICTY, some nations
recommended that a judicial tribunal should be established by
treaty.84 Even the Secretary-General recognized that the customary
manner of creating an international tribunal was by multilateral
treaty.85
That notwithstanding, the ICTY was established
unilaterally through a Security Council resolution-without
employing the more "representative and democratic forum of the
77 U.N. CHARTER art. 41, para. 1; art. 42, para. 1.
78

See id. at art. 41, para. 1.

79 Resolution 827 exhibited the Council's "grave alarm at continuing reports of
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the
territory of the former Yugoslavia... including reports of mass killings, massive,
organized and systematic detention and rape of women and the continuance of the
practice of 'ethnic cleansing."' S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at
29, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
80 Karnavas, supranote 48, at 21.
81 S.C. Res. 827,'U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
82 Barboza, supra note 15, at 128; see Karnavas, supra note 48, at 23.
83 Barboza, supranote 15, at 128.
84 Koran, supra note 58, at 48. Specifically, the nations that suggested the ICTY be
formed by treaty were: China, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and Yugoslavia. Id. at 48 n.29.
85 Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 394.
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General Assembly."86 The Secretary-General stated that the
Tribunal's creation by the Security Council had two distinct
advantages over treaty establishment.87 The benefits of Council
resolution were expedience88 and the instant binding of all U.N.
member nations to the ICTY's mandate.89
An additional advantage to the Council's resolution as opposed
to treaty, as noted by the Secretary-General, was that "there could
be no guarantee that [treaty] ratifications w[ould] be received from
those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly
effective." 90 In other words, the Secretary-General worried that
the establishment of the ICTY by treaty would not, even after
lengthy debate and frequent compromise, gain endorsement by
certain key states.91 It is critical to stress that the creation of the
ICTY by treaty would have taken a significant amount of time; it
would have been diluted by extensive compromises; and it may
never have been ratified by material nations. Thus, the Security
Council's action was inventive and clever, albeit unlawful.
This sly maneuver by the Security Council prompted one
86

Koran, supra note 58, at 48.

87 1 VIRGINIA

MORRIS

&

MICHAEL

SCHRAF,

AN

INSIDER'S

GUIDE

TO THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY

(1995). Alternatively, several advantages would have
existed had the Tribunal been established by treaty, including:
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 42

(1) the participation of all the United Nations member states in the
establishment of the tribunal would endow it with greater legitimacy; (2)
signatory states to a treaty establishing the Tribunal could not later dispute the
legitimacy of the establishment of the Tribunal; and (3) the participation by
such a generality of states ... would provide evidence of the consensus required
to create international customary law, which would eventually bind even nonsignatory states.
Koran, supra note 58, at 48 (citations omitted).
88 The alacrity with which the Tribunal was formed left several notable drafting
ambiguities, the most remarkable of these being that both the prosecutor and the accused
can appeal the final judgments rendered by the Trial Chamber. Koran, supra note 58, at
46. This language seems to allow the prosecution to appeal the acquittal of the accused.
Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: A
Comparison with the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1,
26(1996).
89 Kalinauskas, supra note 38, at 394.
90 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
91 Koran, supra note 58, at 49.
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scholar to remark, "[i]t appears that the Security Council usurped
General Assembly powers so that states such as ...

the former

Yugoslavia... would have little or no voice in... the setting of
parameters for" the ICTY.92 In other words, the Council may have
formed the ICTY through resolution rather than treaty to force
nations that otherwise would not have ratified the treaty to be,
nonetheless, bound by it. Speculations such as these, along with
several other factors discussed above, predestined the ICTY's
establishment to be suspect and its lawfulness questioned.
III. The Illegality of the ICTY's Establishment
In examining the legitimacy of the ICTY's creation, the
questions of whether an international criminal tribunal should have
been formed and whether the acts committed in the former
Yugoslavia were severe violations of humanitarian law are wholly
distinct from whether the ICTY was formed according to rule. It
would be comfortable to focus exclusively on the repugnancy of
the offenses and the need for the ICTY and neglect the manner and
process by which it was created. Stated differently, "[t]he question
of the criminality of the atrocities that occurred in the former
Yugoslavia is distinguishable from the question of which courts
have jurisdiction to try those accused of these offenses." 93 The
jurisdiction to try those accused came under scrutiny in the
Tribunal's first case, Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic.94
A. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic
On May 7, 1996, Dusko Tadic 95 became the first accused to go
to trial before the ICTY. Prior to the war, Tadic was the proprietor
of a pub and an instructor of karate in a primarily Muslim town.96
As the war progressed, Tadic became a "freelance torturer [and]
murderer ' 97 and is presumed to have killed his best friend for
92 Karnavas, supra note 48, at 23.
93 Koran, supra note 58, at 44.
94 Defense Motions, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T (June 23, 1995).
95 Dusko Tadic is also known as Dusan Tadic. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic
a.k.a. "Dule" a.k.a. Dusan, Indictment (Amended), ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T (Sept. 26,
1995).
96 SCHARF,

supra note 21, at 8.

97 Id. at 100.
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being Muslim.98
Tadic was charged in a thirty-four count indictment with
"grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws
or customs of war and crimes against humanity."99 More
specifically, the indictment alleged that Tadic "murdered, raped,
and assaulted numerous victims" at a Bosnian Serb detention
facility.' 00 Ultimately, Tadic was convicted of committing crimes
against humanity and violations of the laws of customs of war' ° '
and sentenced to twenty-five years of incarceration.'0 2
Tadic's first pre-trial motion, Defense Motion on the
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal (Motion), claimed several grounds
03
upon which the ICTY lacked jurisdiction as a judicial body.1
Tadic raised "a series of constitutional issues which all turn[ed] on
the limits of the power of the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations and determining what
action[s] or measures can be taken under [it]."' 4
More
specifically, Tadic's Motion asserted a want of jurisdiction on
three premises: "(1) the Security Council lacked the power to
establish the Tribunal [and] its establishment was unlawful; (2) the
primacy jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal had no basis in
international law; and (3) the Tribunal lacked subject-matter

98 Id. at 96.
99 Douglas Stringer & Diane Marie Amann, International Criminal Law, 31 INT'L

L. 611, 616 (1997).
100 Maj. Ian G. Corey, The Fine Line Between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v.
Tadic and the Customary International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 MIL. L.
REV. 145, 148 (2000).
101 Diplomatie Judiciaire, Dusko Tadic, at www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/

Tpy/Tadic.htm (November 1, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation). More precisely, Tadic was convicted of

eleven counts of "persecution, beatings, torture, and inhumane treatment of Muslims and
Croats." Ungar, supra note 5, at 677.
102 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - Press Release,
Tadic Sentence Increased to 25 Years Imprisonment, JL/P.I.S./447-E

(1999),

at

http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p447-e.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
103 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Defense Motion on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T (June 23, 1995).
104 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 2 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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5 It is essential to bear in mind that if Tadic
jurisdiction .... ",'0
were to prevail on any one of his challenges to the ICTY's
legitimacy, there would have been two probable consequences: he
would have been acquitted and the notion of the ICTY would have
been shattered. The Tribunal's judges were conscious of both
outcomes.
The Trial Chamber dismissed Tadic's Motion with regards to
both primacy and subject-matter jurisdiction, but deemed itself
incompetent to decide the legitimacy of the ICTY's creation." 6
The Trial Chamber considered itself without the authority to
assess the legality of the Council's establishment of the Tribunal
and its exercise of jurisdiction over individuals.' °7 The Trial
Chamber held, generally, that the Security Council's
determination that a threat to the peace existed in Yugoslavia was
"a nonjusticiable, political question inappropriate for judicial
review."'0 8
Due to the fact that Tadic's Motion disputed the jurisdiction of
the ICTY, Tadic was granted an interlocutory appeal to the
ICTY's Appeals Chamber.0 9 This type of direct and immediate
appeal is authorized by the Tribunal's statute only for challenges
to the Tribunal's jurisdiction. "0° Unlike the Trial Chamber, the
Appeals Chamber believed that it was "la competence de la
competence" or that it possessed the jurisdiction to decide its own
jurisdiction."'

105

Corey, supra note 101, at 148 (citations omitted).

106

Ungar, supra note 5, at 690.

107

Stringer & Amann, supra note 100, at 616.

108 Id.at 617. In making this decision, the Trial Chamber relied, in part, upon the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Id.
109 SCHRAF, supra note 21, at 104.

110 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence 72(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.24 (amended July 2002); Koran, supra note
58, at 51.
Ill Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 18 (Oct. 2, 1995). It has been
suggested that because explication of the U.N. Charter would have political
repercussions, the Appeals Chamber should have followed the Trial Chamber's lead and
deemed an assessment of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to be a political question. Koran,
supra note 58, at 67; see Jos6 E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, 7 EUR.
J. IN''I L. 245, 254-55 (1996).
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Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber held that it could
determine the legitimacy of the Council's establishment of the
ICTY.1 2 The Appeals Chamber, in making this determination
examined Tadic's three-pronged attack of the legality of the
Security Council's creation of the ICTY." 3 Tadic contended:
(a) that the establishment of [the] Tribunal was never
contemplated by the framers of the Charter as one of the
measures to be taken under Chapter VII... ; (b) that the
Security Council is constitutionally or inherently incapable of
creating a judicial organ ... ; [and (c) that] the establishment 11of4
the International Tribunal ... has not been established by law.

The Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected all of these claims
and concluded that the Council had, in fact, acted within the scope
of its authority." 5 This article asserts that Tadic's first two
challenges to the ICTY's creation were valid and that the ICTY
was, in fact, established illegally.
1. ICTY's FormationExceeded Security Council Chapter
VII Authority
In denying the allegation that the framers of the Charter did
not contemplate the creation of the ICTY (or a similar entity), the
Appeals Chamber began its analysis by recognizing that the
formation of a tribunal is not explicitly delineated as an
enforcement option in either Article 41 or 42 of the Charter." 6 As
previously stated, Article 42 involves military peacekeeping
enforcement measures, while Article 41 offers non-military
112 King, supra note 15, at 515.
113 Tadic actually attacked the ICTY's establishment on four grounds. Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T (May 7, 1997). The fourth
allegation maintained that the ICTY, a judicial tribunal, was not an effective or sensible
method to restore peace to the Yugoslavian region and, thus, was unlawfully established
by the Council as a measure to maintain the peace. Id. The Chamber promptly and
appropriately rejected Tadic's claim and noted that the Security Council enjoys "wide
discretionary powers in this regard" and no legal or valid formula exists to evaluate the
Council's decisions ex post facto. Id. This article concurs with the Appeals Chamber
that the measures the Council chooses to enforce the peace cannot be retrospectively
second-guessed based upon their effectiveness. As such, this unmeritorious assertion of
Tadic's will not be addressed beyond mention in this footnote.
114 Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 32, 40.
115

King, supra note 15, at 515.

116

Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 33.
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options." 7 Specifically, Article 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or

partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations."1 8
Tadic argued that the Article suggests measures such as
interruptions to economic, political, and communicative relations,
and neither alludes to nor permits the formation of a judicial
body."19
The Appeals Chamber's response to Tadic's contention
focused upon the statutory construction of the Article. 120 The
Chamber noted that it was clear that the "measures set out in
Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not
exclude other measures. All the Article requires is that they do not
involve 'the use of force.' It is a negative definition."'' In other
words, the list of possible enforcement measures in Article 41 is
not exhaustive, simply illustrative.122 Consequently, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that the establishment of the ICTY "falls
squarely within the powers of the Security Council."' 2 3

The Appeals Chamber's examination of the Security Council's
Article 41 powers, however, failed to heed a basic canon of
statutory interpretation-ejusdem generis.124 Ejusdem generis or
"of the same genus" is a "canon of construction holding that when
a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of specific
persons or things, the general word or phrase will be construed as
applying only to persons or things of the class within which the
117

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 41, para. 1; art. 42, para. 1.

118 Id. at art. 41, para. 1.

119 Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 34. Tadic additionally maintained that the
actions mentioned in Article 41 are those taken by Member States. This is not the case,
however, with the creation of the ICTY. Id.
120 Id.at para. 35.
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id. at para. 36.

124 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

218 (Pocket ed. 1998).
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specific types fall."' 25 In other words, when a list of options is
referred to by a broad phrase, that broad phrase will be interpreted
to include only those options in that same general category or in
the same genus as the list of options." 6 For instance, "in the
phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard
animal, the general language any other barnyardanimal--despite
its seeming breadth-would probably be held as applying only to
four-legged, hoofed mammals (and thus would exclude
chickens)."' 27
In applying this canon of construction to Article 41, it becomes
evident that the creation of the Tribunal was beyond the scope of
permissible Security Council action. Article 41 lists several
acceptable measures that the Council may take under
circumstances where a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace,
or an act of aggression exists.' 28 They all, however, involve a
limited or complete stoppage of economic, political, or
communicative ties.'29 As such, the general phrase that the
Council may choose what non-military means can be used to
effectuate the ends of its decisions, while seemingly limitless,
should have been construed to include only measures of the same
kind as the listed measures (e.g., interruptions to economic,
political, or communicative ties).

Id. at 218. It is also worth mention that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not a
uniquely American concept. It is a well-settled canon of judicial interpretation employed
by many nations and international organizations throughout the world, for example: the
United Kingdom (The Queen on the Application of Vargas v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, 2001 WL 1560727); the International Court of Justice (Cameroon v.
United Kingdom, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 91); Canada (Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd.,
[2000] S.C.R. 342); Australia (Laemthong International Lines Co. Ltd. v. BPS Shipping
Ltd., 190 CLR 181, 192 (Austl. 1997)); the Philippines (Aida Sevilla Mendoza, A Case
of Opposing and Conflicting Personalities,PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Feb. 4, 2001, at 12);
Malaysia (Salleh Buang, Interim Measures To Save Heritage Buildings, NEW STRAITS
TIMES, May 25, 2001, at 11); New Zealand (Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee
Appeal No. 80/91, N.S. (1991)); the International Law Commission (International Law
Commission, Document A/CN.4/L.569 (Aug. 13, 1998)); Hong Kong (Hksar v. Ma Wai
Kwan, 1997 HKLRD 761, 804 (1997)); and the European Union (Schotte GmbH v.
Parfums Rothschild, [1987] E.C.R. 4905, 4909).
126 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 124, at 218.
125

127 Id.
128 U.N. CHARTER art. 41, para. 1.
129 See id.
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In addition, another judicial principle, the Rule of Lenity,
further suggests that the Appeals Chamber interpreted Article 41
incorrectly. The Rule of Lenity states "that a court, in construing
an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more
lenient sentence."' 3 ° Stated differently, the Rule of Lenity requires
that "where there is ambiguity in ' 3a1 criminal statute, doubts are
resolved in favor of the defendant."'
In the situation regarding the ICTY, the Security Council was
effectively exercising penal powers. Examination and analysis of
penal statutes demand restrictive interpretations of those
statutes. 32 Accordingly, because the establishment of the ICTY
could and eventually did result in the punishment of Tadic, the
Appeals Chamber should have resolved all questions or
ambiguities in the statute (Article 41) with a narrow interpretation
and in Tadic's favor.'33 The Rule of Lenity required the conclusion
that the questionable establishment of the ICTY be resolved in
favor of Tadic and, consequently, the establishment was beyond
the realm of the Security Council's authority. Subsequently, the
Appeals Chamber misapplied the doctrine of competence de la
competence and sanctioned the exertion of jurisdiction by it over
individuals.
In summary, had the Appeals Chamber properly observed the
judicial doctrines of ejusdem generis and the Rule of Lenity, it
would have recognized that the creation of the ICTY, while
needed, was nevertheless, beyond the scope of the Council's
Chapter VII powers. 34 As such, the ICTY was created through an
124, at 557. Unlike the principle of
ejusdem generis, the Rule of Lenity does not garner similar widespread international
support.
131 State v. Stephans, 22 Wash. App. 548, 559 (1979).
132 Id.
130 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note

133

See id.

134 Additionally, it is worth notation that the U.N. was established and Article 41
was drafted close in time to the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. WORLD
ALMANAC BOOKS, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2000 593 (1999) (these
three institutions were established shortly after the end of World War II). As such, the
absence of any mention of a Security Council power to establish a criminal tribunal in
Article 41, further supports the conclusion that the Charter's drafters did not intend for
the Council to possess such a power.
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illegitimate process, and accordingly did not possess the
jurisdiction to try Tadic or anyone else. 35
2. The Security Council is ConstitutionallyIncapable of
Creatinga JudicialEntity
Tadic's next challenge asserted, essentially, that because the
Security Council did not possess judicial powers itself, it could not
create a subsidiary organ with judicial powers.' 36 The Appeals
Chamber summarily rejected this contention. 37 It stated that this
notion of U.N. jurisprudence was "untenable" and "result[ed] from
a fundamental
misunderstanding of the constitutional set-up of the
' 38
Charter.'
Generally, Tadic contested the formation of the Tribunal
because the Charter created the Security Council as an executive
body.'39 He maintained that the Council possessed no judicial
powers and, consequently, could not delegate or exercise judicial
functions through a subordinate body. 4 '
The Chamber began its analysis of Tadic's position by
correctly noting that the Council is clearly neither a judicial body
nor in possession of judicial authority.' 4' Notwithstanding that,
the Chamber recognized that the Council is charged with the duty
to maintain global peace and security. 142 The Chamber averred
that the creation of the ICTY was merely the Council acting in its
capacity as international peacekeeper. 43
The Tribunal's
establishment was the means chosen by the Council to fulfill its
mission of maintaining peace and security. 44 Precisely, the
Chamber stated the Council could establish a "judicial organ in the
form of an international criminal tribunal as an instrument for the
exercise of its own primary function of maintenance of peace and
135 See supra notes 105-24.

136 Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 37.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.

142 See id.
143 Id. at para. 38.
144 Id.
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security."' 45 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber held that the
Council's formation of the ICTY was a permissible action.' 46
The Chamber continued this line of reasoning by stating that
the establishment of the Tribunal was neither an improper
delegation of power by the Council nor a seizure of judicial power
from another U.N. body.'4 7 Rather, the establishment of the ICTY
was an acceptable Council action in light of the Council's mandate
and because no specific organ of the U.N. is expressly charged or
empowered with the establishment of secondary organizations.' 48
With specific regard to the creation of secondary
organizations, the Appeals Chamber noted that a primary U.N.
organ's creation of a secondary organ did not require
particularized powers.' 49 By way of example, the Chamber
explained that the General Assembly had created such subsidiary
bodies as the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East and the
U.N. Administrative Tribunal. 50 As such, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that the Security Council's creation of the ICTY was
constitutionally permissible (1) because it was the measure the
Council deemed appropriate to fulfill its mission of maintaining
peace and security and (2) because the Tribunal's formation
neither required delineated powers nor usurped authority from
another U.N. body.
Although the Chamber's analysis is convincing at first glance,
its reading of the Charter again misconstrues the precise language
of the Charter. Article 29 of the Charter states, "[t]he Security
Council may establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of its functions."'' Bearing in mind that the
function of the Security Council is the maintenance of
international peace, the Security Council can create such
peace and the Appeals
subsidiary organs to maintain 5international
2
fact.
this
noted
aptly
Chamber
145 Id.
146

Id. at para. 37-38.

147Id. at para. 38.
148

King, supra note 15, at 561.

149 Id.

150 Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 38.
151U.N. CHARTER art. 29, para. 1.
152

See Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 38.
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The Appeals Chamber neglected, however, to heed the
boundaries of this ostensibly limitless interpretation. The
boundaries are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter.153 They
delineate the manners by which the Council may perform its
function and, consequently, the manners by which a Security
Council's secondary organ can perform its functions.'54 In other
words, the Council and its subsidiary organs may act to maintain
international peace only in manners permitted by Chapter VII. As
this article asserted previously, the Security Council cannot
unilaterally create a judicial tribunal and, accordingly, cannot
delegate that function to a subsidiary organ.
It is beyond question that the Security Council can establish
subsidiary organs to carry out its mission of preserving
international peace and security.' 55 The manners by which the
Council can exercise its powers of maintaining international peace
and security, however, must conform to the means permitted in
Chapter VII of the Charter. As such, because the creation of a
judicial tribunal is not a means by which the Council may
maintain the peace, it was improper for the Council to form a
subsidiary organ to effectuate that purpose-and a second example
of how the ICTY was established unlawfully.
3. The ICTY was not "Establishedby Law"
Tadic's third and final challenge alleged that the ICTY was not
"established by law" and, therefore, violated Article 14 of the
56
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).'
The ICCPR provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n the determination
of any criminal charge against [the accused], or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
establishedby law.""'

153

See U.N.

CHARTER

art. 39-42.

154 Id.
155

Id. at art. 29, para. 1.

156

Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 41; see

JOHN E. ACKERMAN & EUGENE

O'SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7

(2000).

157 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Article 14, para. 1

(emphasis added).
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Tadic argued that the phrase "established by law" meant
"established by a legislature." '58 He contended that the formation
of ICTY was purely the decision of the executive and was not a
decision made with the "democratic control necessary to create a
'
judicial organisation in a democratic society."159
Consequently,
because the ICTY was not created by the
"legislature," Tadic
' 60
alleged that it was not "established by law."'
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that Tadic's
interpretation of "established by law" was a reasonable one and
161
that other courts had adopted it.
Ultimately, however, the

Chamber rejected Tadic's interpretation because the United
Nations did not "technically" possess a legislative body. 162 The
Chamber stated that the structure of the U.N. did not permit such a
"separation of powers analysis" and the duty of being "established
by law" was not applicable in the same manner in the international
63
arena. 1
The Chamber noted that another interpretation of "established
by law" is more discerning and applicable in the international
setting. 64
The Chamber embraced an interpretation of
"established by law" meaning that a court or tribunal must be
created "in accordance with the rule of law."' 165 In other words, the
ICTY and other international tribunals "must be established in
158

Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 43.

159

Id.(citation omitted).

160

Id.

The Court noted that the European Convention on Human Rights had adopted
such an interpretation of "established by law." Id.(citations omitted).
162 Id.; Ungar, supranote 5, at 691.
161

163 Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 43; ACKERMAN & O'SULLIVAN, supra note
156, at 7-8.
164 Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-I-T, at para. 45. The Tribunal opined that this alternative
interpretation is more applicable in the international setting because it is in "full
conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments." Id.
165 Id. An additional interpretation of "established by law" may be gleaned through
an examination of its alternative---"established arbitrarily." In other words, the ICCPR's
prerequisite that courts be "established by law" may mean that judicial bodies must
possess certain protective measures against dictatorial or capricious formation. Although
the Chamber did not adopt this interpretation, it garners support with some preeminent
international criminal law scholars, such as Professor Johan Van der Vyver. See Johan
Van der Vyver, International Criminal Law Lecture at Emory University School of Law
(Spring 2002).
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accordance with the proper international standards; it must provide
all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full
conformity with internationally recognized human rights
instruments."' 66 The Chamber concluded, after an examination of
the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, that the Tribunal
had been established in conformity
with the rule of law and, thus,
167
was "established by law.,
The Chamber's analysis and eventual rejection of Tadic's
interpretation of "established by law" was a sound jurisprudential
decision. The ICCPR's main concerns with regard to courts or
tribunals being "established by law" are due process and fairness
concerns. 168 The ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence secure
the highest standards of its judges and "other provisions in the
Rules ensure equality of arms and fair trial[s].', 169 Additionally,
Article 21 of the ICTY's Statute "adopted almost verbatim" the
"fair trial guarantees" of the ICCPR. 7 ° In sum, the ICTY ensures
that the accused be afforded the protections contemplated under
ICCPR Article 14 and, consequently, Tadic's challenge that the
ICTY was not "established by law" is unmeritorious and was
appropriately rejected by the Appeals Chamber.
Conclusion
In the post-Cold War era, the Security Council has undergone
a power metamorphosis.
The Council has experienced
unprecedented expansions in both the scope of its involvement and
the authority exercised within that scope.' 7 ' For example, during
the first four decades of the Council's existence, it adopted
approximately 650 resolutions; in the fifteen or so years since, it
has adopted over 1000.172 Some scholars argue that the Security

166

Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-T-T, at para. 45.
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Id. at para. 46-47.
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Tadic, ICTY No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 46.

171

King, supranote 15, at 510.

ACKERMAN & O'SULLIVAN,

supra note 156, at 8.

172 See id at 509; United Nations Dag Hammarskjld Library, United Nations
Documentation: Research Guide at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact 1998.htm
(lasted visited Nov. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
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Council acted, and continues to act, in manners "presumably
unanticipated by its framers."' 73 The establishment of the ICTY
was, in all likelihood, one of those manners. The question that
persists, however, is whether Council inactivity was worse than its
action in one of those "unanticipated manners."
Abraham Lincoln once said, "I would consent to any great
'
evil, to avoid an even greater evil."174
Lincoln's statement was
referring to his acquiescence to the extension of slavery in order to
preserve the unity of the United States.'75 The international
community and, more specifically, the ICTY's Appeals Chamber
were faced with an analogous situation with regard to the creation
of the ICTY.
The Appeals Chamber was confronted with the unenviable
choice of sanctioning the Security Council's unlawful
establishment of the ICTY or permitting Yugoslavian war
criminals to evade responsibility for their ruthless acts. To
compound the difficulty and complexity of the ICTY's choice, the
Appeals Chamber was cognizant of the fact that no other
international body was capable of trying the Yugoslavian war
criminals. Accordingly, the Chamber consented to the "great evil,"
the illegal establishment of the ICTY, to avoid an even "greater
evil," the non-punishment of the war's criminals.
It is essential to bear in mind that whether the ICTY was
necessary or beneficial is a distinct question from whether its
formation was legal. In other words, the fact that the ICTY was
needed and has been effective in its aims does not make its
creation lawful, although it may make its creation justifiable.
Under traditional canons of judicial interpretation, the ICTY was
established illegally. The Security Council exceeded its authority,
departed from customary practices and, ultimately, was
constitutionally incapable of establishing an international criminal
tribunal.
The ICTY's Appeals Chamber, however, was faced with a
unique and compelling situation. It was forced to make a decision

173 King, supra note 15, at 509-10.
174 Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois
(Oct. 16, 1854).

175 id.

2002]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

with no perfect choice.176 The Chamber, consequently, used some
less than ideal interpretations and explications to, ultimately,
provide and administer justice.177 The Yugoslavian situation
called for an innovative and progressive response to an urgent
situation. 7 8 The Security Council acted, and the ICTY sanctioned
its illegal actions-because it was the best of the imperfect
solutions. 79
'
The age-old maxim "two wrongs don't make a right" has
finally faltered. In a situation where one wrong is the commission
of heinous and brutal war crimes and the other wrong is the illegal
establishment of a tribunal to try those criminals-two wrongs do
make a right.

176 Cf Jeffrey W. Davis, Accidental Achievements: The Supreme Court has
Improved Capital Punishment Jurisprudence-butnot because it is Committed to the
Principles of Furman v. Georgia, 10 J. S. LEGAL HIST. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that

in extraordinary circumstances failing to follow traditional canons
interpretation and precedent can be both necessary and proper).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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